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Summary 
 
 This thesis aims to identify and provide a comprehensive discussion regarding patent 
trolls, more precisely what defines a patent troll, what are the distinguishing marks, 
characteristics and strategies of these entities, combined with an analysis of both their 
negative harm and positive effects, furthermore elaborating and analysing the evolution of the 
related legislations and legal acts, concentrating on the United States of America. 
 As most characters in business, trolls too have a historical background and a system 
they have emerged from. Submarine patents are among the first examples of the undesirable 
impact of loopholes in a legal system and what they might do and cause to economics, legal 
and business related fields. Even though this problem was eliminated in the late 1990, its 
adverse and highly damaging influence still appears from time to time in the 21th Century. 
Patent trolls followed submarine patents, further exploiting the legal system, and if possible 
causing even more damage in the abovementioned fields than submarine patents did. Due to 
legal circumstances these entities function – most of the time – legally, they do not cross any 
related law, however are being usually negatively judged widely by experts, law professors, 
businessmen and politicians. Despite of their legal functioning there are certain characteristics 
and strategies that are typical and quite obvious marks of the operation of a patent troll. Even 
though these undertakings may follow different techniques, these strategies regularly appear 
within their behaviour, additionally they widely differ from other patent-interested companies, 
placing a heavy burden on the targeted firms. 
 Owing to their feature and mainly adverse impact patent trolls are a very up-to-date 
topic both within legal and economic related discussions and the reason behind this popularity 
is their controversial feature. These patent assertion entities are vividly part of the intellectual 
property related fields of the business playing a major role and being a major cause of the rise 
of patent related law suits. The positive effects and the negative harm of their activity can 
both be highlighted, as much as the growing number of this industry. The reasons behind the 
increasing number is quite widespread all the way from the related patent laws and quality of 
patents to the asymmetrical bargaining power that leads to attractive payoffs and settlements. 
 Both the U.S. States and even higher political stages have all realized how urgent it is 
to provide new and amend the existing necessary legislations in order to strengthen the 
position of targeted firms, innovators and stop patent trolls from further developing. In the 
past couple of years many bills were introduced regarding this subject aiming to solve the 
necessary legislation and patent litigation problems. 
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 The issue of patent trolls due to their negative effect on economics, inventions and 
R&D investments is an everyday topic at the highest political stages too. Politicians are trying 
to rephrase the patent system, more precisely the related law in order to support innovators, to 
„help address some of the problematic behaviours of patent trolls.”1 Apart from political 
sectors there are different major entities and companies that try to fight against them too, both 
separately and together, either by different programmes, or by entering law suits brought by 
these non-assertion entities in order to provide a judgement in favour of these targeted entities 
are.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf - Report - Patent assertion and U.S. 
innovation – Executive Office of The President. June 2013 
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1. Introduction  
 
 Intellectual property law, specifically patents are closely related to the innovation 
ecosystem2 of different markets, fields thus to the promotion of science, R&D systems, wide-
ranged investments and support of innovators in general. To ensure the security of these fields 
is firstly a legal related question, to provide sufficiently strict, but flexible rules that cannot be 
circumvented. However, it is in the nature of legal systems that they encompass loopholes too. 
These inadequacies may be scarcely noticeable, but on other cases may cause serious 
problems and have adverse impact on mutual fields. Patent trolls are a great example of a 
harmful consequence of an imperfection – amongst other several reasons - within the patent 
law in the U.S.  
 Apart from the legal related problems there are several reasons and different causes 
that enabled patent trolls to come into existence and emerge. The technical development 
boom, especially in the information technology sector, in relation with this the growing 
number of patent applications, the overwhelmed examiners, low-quality and over-broad, 
consequently more vulnerable patents all continuously help the rise of patent trolls. 
 Submarine patents were among the first similarly harmful type of entities which 
concentrated on the patent system and its flaws, tricking innovators, however legal changes 
brought an end to such activities.  
 Patent trolls appeared at the beginning of the 21th Century, nowadays took the lead 
and considered as one of the biggest problems in several fields, because even though these 
non-practising entities are firstly connected to the intellectual property law, it does not 
necessary mean they have effect on that (legal) field only. Competition law, business law, 
R&D systems, economics, and business in general, innovations, investments are just some of 
the fields that are deeply involved. On one side this correspondence is what makes patent 
trolls so harmful, their spacious effects reach all these territories, slow down innovations, 
threaten both small and major companies. On the other hand their legally sufficient activity 
renders the other parties’ situation, self-defence and capability to fight against trolls more 
difficult, placing them into uneven bargaining circumstances. 
Furthermore it is worth to take a broader perspective and place the focus on the EU 
horizon and on its related legal field too regarding this subject. Even though patent trolls are a 
more extensive problem in the U.S., the situation and its effect may be a lot closer and may 
                                                 
2 https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf - Report - Patent assertion and U.S. 
innovation – Executive Office of The President. June 2013 
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have a bigger impact than in might appear at first glance. According to some legal academics, 
“patent trolls seem to already have crossed the Atlantic Ocean and reached Europe”3 too. 
Even though it does not have such serious and diversified impact, and both the creation of 
Unified Patent Court and the European Patent may have a big responsibility4 in the future 
existence of patent trolls in the EU, there are already some cases, like IPCom v Apple Inc. 
that indicate the appearance of patent trolls.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Nicolas Janssens de Bisthoven - A joint initiative of Stanford Law School and the University of Vienna School 
of Law - Patent Trolls and Abusive Patent Litigation in Europe: What the Unitary Patent Package Can Learn 
From the American Experience? 
4 Patent letter: Europe becoming battlefield for patent trolls -  
http://www.arnold-siedsma.com/en/news-and-publications/news-and-articles-/patent-letter-europe-becoming-
battlefield-for-patent-trolls 
5 IPCom GmBH v. Apple Inc. (case Nos. 2 O 53/12 and 2 O 95/13) began on February 11 in Mannheim, 
Germany. 
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1.1 Purpose 
 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss what defines patent trolls, focusing on the special 
characteristics and strategies of these patent assertion entities and measuring both their 
negative harm and positive effect on the economics, legal and business as a whole. 
Additionally this thesis aims to analyse and discuss the evolution of the relevant legislation 
and legal acts in the United States of America, concentrating on introduced bills and other 
anti-troll legislation solutions. 
1.2 Method 
 
This paper is using the general legal method. It highly concentrates on the U.S. legislation and 
patent law related introduced bills. The source of information is mainly U.S., less EU related, 
thus the purpose of this thesis shall be completed by examining and analysing legal articles, 
patent law correlated researches, studies, U.S. especially, Federal Circuit and Supreme Court 
case-law. 
 In section 5.2 regarding the Investment Act and PATENT Act a comparative method 
is conducted mainly in order to highlight the legislative differences between the two bills, thus 
providing a deeper view and understanding of the U.S. anti-troll bills.  
 Patent trolls are a relatively new field of patent law, therefore the research is relying 
mainly on legal, academic articles and legal papers rather than books. 
 Apart from legal research and the aforementioned, economic research will be used in 
limited extent in order to highlight the adverse impact of the activity of non-practising 
entities. 
1.3 Limitation 
 
In order to provide and overall picture regarding the subject of the thesis the following 
limitations should be acknowledged. 
 It is assumed that the reader has prior knowledge with the relevant legislation due to 
providing detailed information regarding the related law is not the aim nor the scope of this 
paper.  
 In addition the thesis is focusing inter alia on the anti-troll legislation, more precisely 
on the introduced bills, through U.S legislation wishes to balance the related patent laws and 
provide sustainable solutions to the urgent legal-related problems. Discussing and analysing 
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all the related patent laws and existing patent legislations is not included in the thesis, 
however due to the topic itself they might be mentioned or referred. 
 Furthermore detailed economic analysis will not be provided either, is not subject of 
this paper, however to understand the overall impact of patent trolls, some refers will be 
highlighted due to the major effect of the activity of patent trolls on the economic and 
business related fields. 
 
1.4 Organisation of the Paper 
 
In the first section the concept of the patent troll phenomenon will be evaluated, including 
historical background and discussions regarding the definition and different titles of patent 
trolls. 
 
 The following part will focus on the main characteristics and strategies of these 
entities, how they are functioning, what is their main activity. 
 
 The third part will examine whether and in what extent these strategies of different 
patent trolls are harmful or rather carry positive effects, additionally it will specify the reasons 
behind the growing number of the patent assertion entities. 
 
 The fourth segment will provide an analyses regarding the evolution of the related 
legislation, and will draw attention on other solutions too. 
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2. What is a patent troll? 
 
The non-official legal term – even though it has been recently acknowledged by the 
U.S. Supreme Court too6 - patent troll is undeniably more common within the United States 
of America (U.S.) than in the European Union (EU). The reason for that could be found inter 
alia in the differences between the U.S. and EU legal systems. The term obviously has an 
adverse sound that leads the non-professional and perhaps even some professional readers to 
understand and connect it with a negative meaning. As Nicolas Janssens de Bisthoven 
underlines it – in legal speaking, a well-performing world the patent systems would protect 
the inventor „by according him a temporary and territorial monopoly, in return for making 
his invention available to society in order to promote research and technical improvements”7 
However there are loopholes in every legal system and more and more legal articles are 
highlighting that patent troll entities as a serious – not to mention, growing – problem both 
within the legal and economic systems.  
It is challenging to find a definition that describes both the aims, strategies and 
characteristics of patent trolls due to how different they can be and how new and 
insufficiently known they are within some business sectors. However, defining those entities 
with such behaviour is crucial in order to be able to draw the line between the legally 
operating entities and – also legally – functioning patent trolls. Patent trolls are a very 
interesting mixture of legality and economic harm. Owing to patent law regulations they are 
generally cooperating with the legal system, they hold all the rights of patents, even though 
they are not the inventors. Generally speaking the intention of patent regulations was not 
aiming to defend such entities, but rather to ’promote the progress of science’, and defend the 
inventors,8 however the legal system and related laws do not differentiate between the 
inventor or the patent holder regarding the rights of patents – due to „it is not necessary that 
                                                 
6 Supreme Court of the Unites States – COMMIL USA, LLC v Cisco Systems, INC. Decided May 26, 2015 
7 Nicolas Janssens de Bisthoven - A joint initiative of Stanford Law School and the University of Vienna School 
of Law - Patent Trolls and Abusive Patent Litigation in Europe: What the Unitary Patent Package Can Learn 
From the American Experience? 
8 Good magazine goes bad: the ethics of patent trolling. July 08, 2009.  
http://thepriorart.typepad.com/the_prior_art/2009/07/good-magazine-profile-of-erich-spangenberg-misses-the-
point.html 
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the patent holder is the inventor of the creation in question.”9. Considering such 
consequences, patent trolls seems rather an ethical than a legal problem.10 
All together the strategies followed by patent trolls – apart from some positive 
opinions – are usually widely criticised and even without a concrete and every day –used 
definition, patent assertion entities are mainly negatively judged.11 How seriously it is taken in 
the U.S. is proven by the fact that patent assertion entities are critically taken and are in the 
centre of legal questions at the highest stages too. „The folks that you’re talking about [PAEs] 
are a classic example; they don’t actually produce anything themselves. They’re just trying to 
essentially leverage and hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they can extort some money 
out of them... [O]ur efforts at patent reform only went about halfway to where we need to go 
and what we need to do is pull together additional stakeholders and see if we can build some 
additional consensus on smarter patent laws. – President Obama, February 14, 2013”.12 
To understand how these enterprises work within different fields, what kind of ’tools’ 
they are using, whether they have a rather negative or positive effect on economy one should 
first look at the beginning and the emergence of the patent troll phenomenon. 
2.1 Submarine patents – before patent trolls 
 
As it was mentioned previously to fully understand what patent trolls are one must 
look first at the beginning, namely at the submarine patents.13 Previously in the U.S. it was 
possible to continuously re-file an application14 and in this way delaying – on purpose – the 
date of the granting. It was a useful tool in the hands of applicants who approximately 
predicted the next step within a technology15, filed in a patent application but wished not to 
receive the grant right away and let this period last for – in several circumstances- years. With 
                                                 
9 Nicolas Janssens de Bisthoven - A joint initiative of Stanford Law School and the University of Vienna School 
of Law - Patent Trolls and Abusive Patent Litigation in Europe: What the Unitary Patent Package Can Learn 
From the American Experience? 
10 Nicolas Janssens de Bisthoven - A joint initiative of Stanford Law School and the University of Vienna 
School of Law- Patent Trolls and Abusive Patent Litigation in Europe: What the Unitary Patent Package Can 
Learn From the American Experience? 
11 Nicolas Janssens de Bisthoven - A joint initiative of Stanford Law School and the University of Vienna 
School of Law- Patent Trolls and Abusive Patent Litigation in Europe: What the Unitary Patent Package Can 
Learn From the American Experience? 
12 https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf - Report - Patent assertion and U.S. 
innovation – Executive office of the President. June 2013 
13Nicolas Janssens de Bisthoven - A joint initiative of Stanford Law School and the University of Vienna 
School of Law- Patent Trolls and Abusive Patent Litigation in Europe: What the Unitary Patent Package Can 
Learn From the American Experience?  
14 http://www.baldwins.com/submarine-patents - Submarine Patents 
15 http://www.baldwins.com/submarine-patents - Submarine Patents 
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this practise they purposely let their patent “pending an extremely long time”16 and rise at the 
time the concrete development appeared in the particular field.  It was possible due to the fact 
that there was no pre-grant publication in the U.S. before 200017 and the innocent scientists, 
developers would have developed a product which mostly matched with the details, systems 
of the submarine product. At that time, the applicant let the patent proceeding reach its final 
step, received the grant and charged the developer for royalties. This was possible up until 
1995. Before that the patent term was 17 years counting from the date of grant, but in 1995 
the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (‘TRIPS’) of the World Trade 
Organization (‘WTO’) entered into force and changed a crucial point regarding the term of 
protection: it counts form the filing date.18 
To understand it more clearly in the past in the U.S. it was possible to file a patent on a 
certain technological development that was not yet on the markets. The owner of that 
submarine patent “by requesting repeated “continuations” during the patent application 
process” had the possibility to force the patent to be delayed indefinitely until that certain 
technological development started to appear on the market, say in 1970. The filer then 
stopped requesting continuations, the patent issued, and the patent-seeker easily collected 
royalties on a network routers for 17 years from that point, until 1987.”19 
A very interesting case illustrates how serious the harm of submarine patents can be 
and how easily they still caused some unpleasant surprises in the 21. Century despite the 
change of laws in 1995 and 2000. TRIPS agreement went into effect on the 8th of June 1995 
therefore this date is one of the crucial point regarding filed patents that tented to be 
submarines. The applications filed on this certain date or afterwards – in theory – can cause 
no harm from this point of view because of the new rules that count the protection –which is 
20 years now – from the date of filing, however it was still possible to find awakening 
submarine patents even after 17 years.20 A quite intriguing fact that there are still hiding 
patents is that on the 7th of June -1 day before the deadline – there were approximately ten 
times more application filed in than on any other day.21 
 
                                                 
16 Gene Quinn - Submarine Patents Alive and Well: Tivo Patents DVR Scheduling. Ferbuary 19, 2010 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/02/19/submarine-patents-alive-and-well-tivo-patents-dvr-scheduling/id=9168/ 
17 American Inventors Protection Act of 1999- US applications are published 18 months after filing  
18 Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights –Article 33. 
19 http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?SubmarinePatent 
20 Matt Troyer - 17 Years After TRIPS, Do Submarine Patents Still Lurk in the Depths of Patent Data? 
http://www.acclaimip.com/17-years-after-trips-do-submarine-patents-still-lurk-in-the-depths-of-patent-data/ 
21 Alexander M. Bell (Brown University) - An Autospy on Submarine Patents -  
http://cs.brown.edu/~ambell/subs/Bell_Thesis.pdf 
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 22 
TiVO, Inc.was granted an U.S. Patent on February 16, 2010 regarding data storage 
management and scheduling system – this application was filed on October 20, 1999.23 This 
patent was filed in after the changes in 1995, however it was before 2000, which means that 
even though the protection will count from the filing date, it was probably not published for 
ten years. This shows that for some unknown reason this application – once again – ’stayed 
under water’ for 10 years and will enjoy a U.S. patent protection up until 2019. This leads to 
the conclusion that submarine patents even though they were filed after 8th June, 1995, can 
still unexpectedly appear if the filing date is before November 29, 2000.24 
The particular European legal system avoided this problem with the stricter European 
Patent Convention.25 In this convention, Article 93 states (and stated) that the European Patent 
                                                 
22 Matt Troyer - 17 Years After TRIPS, Do Submarine Patents Still Lurk in the Depths of Patent Data? 
http://www.acclaimip.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/submarine-patent-chart.png 
23 http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/02/19/submarine-patents-alive-and-well-tivo-patents-dvr-
scheduling/id=9168/ 
24 http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s1120.html 
25 Nicolas Janssens de Bisthoven - A joint initiative of Stanford Law School and the University of Vienna 
School of Law- Patent Trolls and Abusive Patent Litigation in Europe: What the Unitary Patent Package Can 
Learn From the American Experience? 
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Office must publish the patent application after the expiry of eighteen months from the date of 
filing:26  “Article 91, Publication of the European patent application 
The European Patent Office shall publish the European patent application as soon as 
possible (a) after the expiry of a period of eighteen months from the date of filing or, if 
priority has been claimed, from the date of priority, or (b) at the request of the applicant, 
before the expiry of that period.”27 This rule avoided the appearance of the submarine patents 
within Europe and is the first example why the early form of patent trolls could not enter the 
field of Europe. 
2.2 The definition and different titles of patent trolls  
 
Originally patents and the different patent systems are supposed to protect developers, 
inventors and their inventions provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are 
susceptible of industrial application.28 However, patent trolls turn this legal bastion upside 
down, they use patents as legal weapons.29 Their strategy and characteristics can vary and 
therefore it is hard to provide a single definition of patent trolls, however the title itself 
usually used as an ugly label.30 Apart from the most common term – patent trolls – there are 
other titles that are regularly used when describing such undertakings, such as ’patent pirate’, 
’patent extortionist’, ’patent parasite’ or ’patent speculator’.31 These are all rather derogatory 
expressions, 32however there are more neutral and diplomatic terms like, ’non-practising 
entities’ or ’non-assertation entities’. Furthermore, there are some positive titles, as patent 
trolls define themselves such as a ’patent angel’33 or as ‘intermediaries’ within the patent 
system.34 
                                                 
26 Nicolas Janssens de Bisthoven - A joint initiative of Stanford Law School and the University of Vienna 
School of Law- Patent Trolls and Abusive Patent Litigation in Europe: What the Unitary Patent Package Can 
Learn From the American Experience? 
27 The European Patent Convention – Article 93, - Publication of the European Patent Application 
28 European Patent Convention – Article 52. 
29 https://www.eff.org/issues/resources-patent-troll-victims - Patent Trolls - Electronics Frontier Foundation 
30 The John Marshall review of intellectual property law – The troll next door 
31 Nicolas Janssens de Bisthoven - A joint initiative of Stanford Law School and the University of Vienna 
School of Law- Patent Trolls and Abusive Patent Litigation in Europe: What the Unitary Patent Package Can 
Learn From the American Experience? 
32 The John Marshall review of intellectual property law – The troll next door. 
33 Nicolas Janssens de Bisthoven - A joint initiative of Stanford Law School and the University of Vienna 
School of Law- Patent Trolls and Abusive Patent Litigation in Europe: What the Unitary Patent Package Can 
Learn From the American Experience? 
34 https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf - Report - Patent assertion and U.S. 
innovation – Executive office of the President. June 2013 
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 Patent trolling as a verb covers the act of collecting and acquiring patents and using 
them against other companies in litigations regarding infringement cases.35 Enforcement of 
patents without manufacturing, researching background, focusing mostly on the enforcement 
of patent rights via aggressive litigation is usually found within the behaviour of patent 
assertion entities. As it was mentioned previously and can be noticed easily the term itself has 
a genuinely negative sound. Judge Koh of the U.S. District Court has explicitly forbidden 
Apple, Inc. to use the term and permitted the company to rather choose other terms such as 
’non-practising entity’, ’patent assertion entity’ or ’a company that doesn’t make anything’.36 
However we can see a different example at the U.S. Supreme Court where not so long ago in 
the Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. Case Justice Scalia used the pejorative term for 
the first time in the Court’s history.37 
Peter Detkin gave the first definition of patent troll by defining it as “somebody who 
tries to make a lot of money of a patent that they are not practicing and have no intention of 
practicing and in most cases never practiced”.38 The most important characteristic – the issue 
of non-practice – can be already seen in this definition and appears in other interpretations 
too. 
Patent trolling also used to express “situations where a patent holder accuses 
infringement and threatens injunctive actions against many companies that might pay a 
licensing fee, than sits back and waits for a payoff.”39 
 As both the definitions and the expression may vary, the forms of these entities can be 
quite different too “First, they could be the companies who purchase controversial patents for 
purpose of asserting them against industry (…). Second, patent trolls could be a company that 
originally sold products, but has either completely or largely closed their operation (…). 
Further, patent trolls could be the agents that assert patent on behalf of patent owners (…). 
Lastly, patent trolls could be the form of Law firms.40 
                                                 
35 Nicolas Janssens de Bisthoven - A joint initiative of Stanford Law School and the University of Vienna 
School of Law- Patent Trolls and Abusive Patent Litigation in Europe: What the Unitary Patent Package Can 
Learn From the American Experience? 
36 GPNE Corp. v. Apple, Inc. - http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2014/06/30/no-name-calling-in-my-court-
judge-bans-use-of-term-patent-troll-in-jury-trial/ 
37 Supreme Court of the Unites States – COMMIL USA, LLC v Cisco Systems, INC. Decided May 26, 2015 - 
http://www.mcgrathnorth.com/litigation/patent-trolls-in-the-united-states-supreme-court/ 
38 Nicolas Janssens de Bisthoven - A joint initiative of Stanford Law School and the University of Vienna 
School of Law- Patent Trolls and Abusive Patent Litigation in Europe: What the Unitary Patent Package Can 
Learn from the American Experience? 
39 The John Marshall review of intellectual property law – The troll next door. 
40 Nicolas Janssens de Bisthoven - A joint initiative of Stanford Law School and the University of Vienna 
School of Law- Patent Trolls and Abusive Patent Litigation in Europe: What the Unitary Patent Package Can 
Learn From the American Experience? 
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3. Characteristics and strategy – how to recognise a patent troll  
 
To differentiate patent trolls from others companies one must look at the main 
characteristics of these entities. There are certain „rules” that most of the non-practicing 
entities seem to follow and these strategies and special circumstances are the key factors in 
deciding whether or not the certain entity is a patent troll, functions as a patent troll, follows a 
typical business method as a non-practicing entity or not. According to Bruce Berman:41 „The 
most disparaged type of Patent Troll is one who purchases a patent for a reduced price at a 
bankruptcy auction, while having no intention to manufacture a product or to innovate further 
with the invention. This type of Patent Troll then seeks out corporations that appear to be 
infringing on their newly acquired patents and sends demand letters threatening the 
companies with injunctions in order to extort licensing fees.”42   
3.1  Characteristics of a patent troll  
 
The characteristics may vary, due to the differences between the targeted fields, the 
strategy of the non-assertion entities, but there are certain distinguishing marks and other 
recognizable features that highlight the existence and actual aim of the patent troll. 
 
i.  Acquires patent rights, patent portfolios 
 
This is absolutely the key characteristic of patent trolls. These patent assertion entities 
usually are in possession of thousands of patent rights mostly in technology software, 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology sector.43 These are the sectors where the highest and 
fastest R&D investments are taking places – therefore more patent applications are filed in 
than in most of the other fields. Furthermore, these „industries contain several competing 
companies.”44A single technological device (e.g.: mobile-phones) might encompass thousands 
of patents45, this made them a wonderful target due to injunctive relief – before the eBay 
                                                 
41 http://www.brodyberman.com/about-us/  
42 The John Marshall review of intellectual property law – The troll next door. 
43 Technology licensing and patent trolls – J.P. Mello; Boston University 
44 Technology licensing and patent trolls – J.P. Mello; Boston University 
45 Thomson Reuters -  Inside the iPhone patent portfolio – September 2012  
http://ip-science.thomsonreuters.com/m/pdfs/iphone-report.pdf  
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case.46 The rule still applies today, the more patent right they own the bigger chance they 
have, and the bigger and wider the field of targets they can concentrate on.  
 
47 
 
There are different ways how these entities purchase or obtain these patents. One of 
the most common technique is – as it was previously mentioned – to purchase patents of 
companies that are under claims management regarded auctions, on a lower price than it is 
worth originally.48 Under enforcement, litigation or bankruptcy procedures the companies’ 
property, including intellectual properties, such as patents are also available to bidders. Other 
possibilities to acquire the patents on a simple patent auction, 49or – surprisingly – even on 
eBay.50  
                                                 
46  BRYAN J. VOGEL, SHANE ST. HILL -  IP: Injunctions and irreparable harm after eBay. June 19, 2012  
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/06/19/ip-injunctions-and-irreparable-harm-after-ebay 
47 Patent trolls and the amount of patents they own: 
http://www.patentqualityinitiative.com/databank/npe%20litigation 
48 The John Marshall review of intellectual property law – The troll next door. 
49 http://www.patentauction.com/ 
50 http://www.ebay.com/sch/Patents-Trademarks-/50973/i.html 
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Additionally the so-called ’dotcom crisis’51was also an extraordinary opportunity to 
patent trolls. It was quite predictable that thousands of patents must have been hidden behind 
the wall of these companies’ legal department52due to the features of the IT field. The broken 
companies were forced under the debt collection procedures, and patent trolls took an 
advantage of that. 
Furthermore, these entities also purchase the IP rights from individuals or smaller 
undertakings that are in a need for financial support, either for their next research or for 
solvency.53 
 
ii. Do not invest into R&D investments 
 
The title ’non-practicing entities’ describes the other major feature, that they do not 
practice the patent rights. This title encompass that they do not participate in research, do not 
invest into development, do not manufacture, instead they focus on royalties, licence fees and 
„aggressive litigation”.54 In a case before the US Supreme court, namely the Continental 
Paper Bag Co. V. Eastern Bag Co. the Court explicitly said that the „the privilege of any 
owner of property to use or not use it, without question of motive.”55 Their main aim differs 
from a usual company’s. Companies tend to use the products that are related to their 
inventions, to their patents. They invest into R&D in order to promote future developments, 
get a better chance in competition, however this is not the intention of a patent troll, but using 
their IP rights as a weapon, solely focusing on royalties, licence fees. 
However it is very important to acknowledge, that the single fact that a company does 
not practice its patent shall not lead to the conclusion that they are patent trolls. An example is 
related to Kodak Co. The company filed a lawsuit for infringement – and won – against Sun 
Microsystems regarding a patent that was never used by Kodak.56 The reasons behind such 
steps – non-practicing – might be unclear, however they could easily be strategic decisions in 
such high-level competition. What distinguishes these undertaking from patent trolls is, that 
the main income of troll companies is usually from one source that is licence fees, royalties, 
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while other company’s revenues are diversified.57 Therefore during any investigation while 
deciding whether a certain undertaking is a patent troll, other characteristics of patent trolls 
are crucial in order to make the right decisions. 
 
iii. Target the right companies 
 
As it was highlighted previously, patent trolls do not invest into any R&D, therefore 
they do not have developments, products that could be patented on their own. This leads to 
the conclusion that they must contact other companies, entities that own IP rights. This is the 
first part where they must target the right companies. Usually they choose companies that are 
under enforcement or bankruptcy procedure and attend auctions, or small companies that need 
financial support, therefore they are willing to sell their patents, patent portfolios. 
The second time when they have to target the right companies, is a very crucial part of 
the patent troll’s activity. They must choose wisely the companies that – due to their claim – 
„infringe” their patents. Most common targets are the major, big, internationally broad 
companies. These undertakings have the financial background to rather settle and pay the 
settlement payments than enter into a very costly litigation procedure and risk permanent 
injunctions.58 These litigations are extremely expensive, last for years and a permanent 
injunction may cause unbearable damages.  
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59 
 
The second type of companies are the small, „inventor-driven”60companies. These 
undertakings usually lack of the financial support, or cannot risk the „shame” that a litigation 
means to a young firm in the eyes of the investors.61 These small startups, and companies 
simply cannot afford the cost of IP litigations, so they tend to license the right from the trolls, 
and pay the royalties. 
In the middle there are typical features that attracts patent trolls. Beside big companies, 
patent trolls are actually not looking at the company itself, but rather at the financial sizes. 
This means they target firms that are „flush with cash and firms that have had recent, positive 
cash shocks.”62 It pays such an important role, that even those companies can be considered 
as targets whose other departments promote better than the one actually holding the patent.63 
Non-practicing entities are usually measuring the possible outcomes, because actual 
litigation is not their core aim, they rather wish to settle with the companies. As Jeffrey H. 
Matsuura says: „Litigation is not the desired outcome for the trolls. Instead, they would prefer 
that the users of the technology make a business judgement that is more economically efficient 
to share a portion of the profits with the patent owner.”64 Because of this risk they highly 
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target firms that are deeply involved with other litigations, however major legal department 
may have a deterrent effect.65 
 Furthermore, broad and low-standard patents involve a higher possibility for a positive 
process, because questionable validity can lead to better settlement negotiations.66 In addition, 
research shows that the more a company invests into R&D, the more attractive it becomes to 
patent trolls and the bigger the possibility for litigation.67  
 
iv. Have asymmetrical bargaining power  
 
In general the risk on the side of patent trolls comparing to the defendants is very 
asymmetrical. There are several reasons why the business policy of patent trolls is so 
successful, therefore not surprisingly the number of trolls are increasing. The overall problem 
is the differences between the parties’ bargaining power.  
IP litigations are very expensive and usually last for years. Datas show that the prices 
have been drastically increasing in the past 68 and recently –according to the American 
Intellectual Property Law Association – „the average suit in which $1 million to $25 million is 
at stake costs $1.6 million through discovery and $2.8 million through trial.”69 Furthermore 
there are absolutely extreme cases, like the Polaroid case, where the litigation lasted for more 
than nine years and ended with a settlement for $925 million.70 Most of the defendant 
companies rather opt for settlement than risk such prices and years of litigation. 
On the one side there are the entities that invested into their patents, these patents 
might be their most precious property, and these are at risk in a litigation. The possibility of 
injunctive relief just strengthens the position of patent trolls, who use this tool71 and do 
propose prices during the settlement negotiation just a bit under the expected litigation prices, 
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in this way further pushing the targeted undertakings to settle, rather than enter litigation.72 
The reality is that those companies which have already invested and incorporated their patents 
into commercial products will „take whatever action is necessary to ensure that they can 
continue to market their product.”73 This situation once again puts the targeted companies 
into a weak negotiating position and rather pushes them towards a one-sided license 
agreement. 
Another problem for the target companies is the secret-feature of patent trolls.74 They 
gladly establish so-called ’shell-companies’, in this way trying to hide their identity putting 
the targets into a very uncomfortable situation not knowing explicitly who the plaintiffs 
representing, afterwards „requiring those who settle to sign non-disclosure agreements, 
making it difficult for defendants to form common defensive strategies (for example, by 
sharing legal fees rather than settling individually).”75 
3.2  Business strategy – how to avoid too wide concept 
 
The strategies of patent trolls are closely related to the previously mentioned 
asymmetrical bargaining power. Their strategies, tactics are successful because of the contrast 
between the trolls and the targeted entities position in the business, additionally because of 
financial reasons. There are many articles and IP experts who were trying to summarise these 
methods and policies. According to Jeffrey H. Matsuura: (Patent trolls) “instead of actively 
moving to make use of their inventions by developing them themselves or by licensing others 
to develop them, they let their patents sit unused. As time passes, they monitor commerce with 
an eye toward parties who may be using the patented inventions in various products. When 
they find such use, the trolls contact the users and demand payment of license fees as 
compensation for permission to make use of the protected inventions. If the contacted parties 
refuse to pay, the trolls may choose to go to court to enforce their patent.”76 Due to other 
opinions, NPEs and their strategies can be summed up as “commercial organizations that 
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acquire patents specifically with the view to bringing actions in the hope of making money by 
forcing settlements”.77 
Their most common practice as business strategy starts with exploiting small or 
broken companies and buy up their patents for a low purchase price at a bankruptcy auction.78 
These patents can be quite broad and be a great use to threaten companies.79 After the 
purchase the patent troll will seek out undertakings that might be infringing their property and 
sends demand letters80to thousands of companies at once.81 The threatening letters usually 
include the possibility of legal action – commonly without any actual evidence of an 
infringement82- or the option to pay certain licence fees. In such asymmetrical bargaining 
power situation, aggressive litigation is the key strategy that all patent trolls follow. Due to 
expensive litigation costs and possible injunctive reliefs, the threat of litigation is highly 
successful and – in line with the patent troll’s core aim and actual intention – usually ends 
with a settlement. This financial reasons put patent trolls into a very strong bargaining 
position and the companies clearly into a weak one. 
However sometimes such strategies can be misleading. While concentrating on the 
characteristics there may be some similarities between patent trolls and other investors, 
innovation enterprises. From a strict point of view these are also non-practicing entities, 
nonetheless the major difference is that the patent trolls acquire the portfolios only to „extract 
royalties”.83 Similarly to those companies for strategic and business reasons undertakings 
might purchase or acquire patents solely in order to defend their businesses. However these 
shall not be constituted as patent trolls either, because unlike patent trolls they are on the 
market and do practice on those markets.  
The third and probably most interesting category regarding the misleading features of 
patent trolls can be the question of universities. According to Mark A. Lemley, universities do 
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share some similar characteristics with patent trolls.84 They are also non-practicing entities 
due to the fact that they – even though produced sixteen times as many patent in 2004 as in 
1980 – do not get engaged in manufacturing, „they do not sell products.”85 There are more 
and more articles that carefully discussing this topic and try to highlight both pro and con 
examples and draw attention to similarities between patent trolls and universities, as how they 
are trying to maximize the financial revenue of their patents, in this way co-working with 
some litigation procedures with patent trolls…86 In the  Myriad Genetics case University of 
Utah joined as plaintiff to the testing company which was „seeking to force a competing 
breast cancer test off the market…if the lawsuit succeeds, the likely result will be less 
competition and higher prices for breast cancer testing.”87 
At first glance this can be surprising, however these examples are harsh and the 
situation of universities are not black and white. Universities are also ’profit-maximizing 
entities’ and the revenue, universities earn from licencing agreements is a great part of their 
financial support. Even though universities may act similar to patent trolls sometimes and 
should absolutely take their impact on society and science – and on patent law itself – more 
seriously they do differ from patent trolls.88 While patent trolls always wait for other 
companies to develop, invest into a new patent and afterward claim for royalties, universities 
does not act similarly. What universities do is actually investing into R&D, they develop the 
new patents, highly participate in these procedures and this clearly distinguishes them from 
the patent assertion entities. 
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4. Their impact on business and economics and reasons behind the 
growing number 
 
The reason why patent trolls are such a divisive topic within the academic, business 
and at the highest political stages is the impact, the lingering effect of their activity. There are 
sharp arguments about trolls and while the vast majority judge patent trolls due to their effect 
on business, economic there are distinctive opinions regarding this subject. 
4.1  Positive influence on economy and society 
 
As it was mentioned previously and will be elaborated furthermore, patent trolls and 
their business policy, their behaviour are quite controversial. More precisely their after-effects 
often appear to be harmful and negative and therefore are commonly judged. Patent trolls 
regularly target small companies, companies that are in financial difficulties, enterprises that 
lack financial support for further R&D investments or other commercial investments. One 
typical example within this territory are the startups. Startups and similar, smaller companies 
are an easy target, due to the fact that they are simply more vulnerable and usually „cash-
poor”, yet defending their patents is costly, therefore they rather „agree to royalty-based 
settlements”.89 However apart from the usually negative voices there are certain opinions 
which claim that patent trolls could be consider in a positive way that increases innovation, 
and especially favourable to these smaller entities.90 
According to Steffen Juranek and Axel Haus cases before the courts that involve a 
patent troll are usually „resolved faster, and need an average 18% less time to resolve-hence 
the speed of technology diffusion increases significantly”.91 Furthermore Juranek and Haus 
highlighted that because a litigation against a troll can be very expensive, defendants rather 
settle with such patent assertation entities – „the patent trolls thus make the licence market 
more effective”.92 According to them because most of the litigation end with a settlement this 
clearly fastens the time cases pend before the court which can be considered as a positive 
effect of their business policy.  
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From another perspective small companies, such as startups may lack the necessary 
financial or material support they need to their investments, to invest further into R&D. Some 
claim that patent trolls actually promote innovation in a way that they are helping small 
companies when acquiring their patents. “Even though they hold the patent, it is not easy for 
a small player to collect money from a large company. By selling the patent to a troll, they 
are paid for their work, and being innovative becomes more lucrative for small actors. It is 
difficult for a little company to sue Apple, for example, while a troll has the expertise and 
resources required.”93In this way undertakings might have the opportunity to further practice 
within their sector, develop new patents, thus investing into new researches. In this situation 
patent trolls have a dual role, on one side they purchase what smaller companies own and 
worked for – patents – on the other hand they pay for these patent rights, and the R&D 
companies can henceforward continue their business. 
They seem to be helpful characters when they contribute between small and big 
companies, as „intermediaries”.94Small companies may have difficulties selling their 
inventions in such tight competition, may find it hard to stand out and it can easily lead to 
unpleasant situation where valuable inventions „fall into disuse or be used without their 
inventor being notified or paid.”95 This role of patent trolls is acknowledged at the highest 
political level too, which agrees that it „brings value to society” with providing help to patent 
holders and buyers to find each other and, this way patent assertion entities pursue the transfer 
of technology to those undertakings that have the necessary background to produce products 
to customers due to patent rights.96 
Relying on among the above mentioned reasoning’s patent trolls wish to be called as 
„patent angels”.97 The main purpose of the patent system is promoting innovation – they 
claim that their strategy actually offers solutions to smaller companies, to innovators in 
difficult situations, provides a chance to fulfil the original intention of the innovations. 
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4.2 The majority’s opinion – adverse repercussion 
 
Many research has been taking place to illustrate the negative impact of patent trolls. 
The adverse effects can be various and may differ regarding smaller or bigger companies, 
however economic and innovation growth, more precisely the negative effect of patent trolls 
activity on these sectors are usually highlighted.  
The negative repercussion at smaller companies are easy to be seen. From a financial 
point of view they can cause harm from the basics, they might harm the „survival and 
operation” of these entities.98 Many small companies, especially new startups that have only 
started to enter the business and merely survive financially may even not be in the position to 
agree to a licensing fee-based settlement. To these companies a demand-letter from a patent 
trolls may entail drastic and irrevocable steps, such as change in their core business, involve a 
significant operational impact, or may lead to exiting the relevant market…etc.99    
 
100 
There are several managers and representatives of different undertakings who claimed how 
serious burden is the activity of patent trolls on their company and what kind of problems it 
entails. “Almost all telecommunication codecs are covered by patents….The company who 
demanded of us exists only to pool and monetize patents and listed about 30 violating patents. 
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We had no choice but to pay, and as a young company, it killed us.”101 Furthermore there are 
some opinions which emphasize the difficult and hopeless situation from a startups 
perspective. “They sued my startup for infringement on a group of insanely broad software 
patents. While many much larger companies are fighting we do not have the resources to do 
so. It is the single most frustrating experiences I’ve had professionally. Extortion, pure and 
simple. The troll even admitted his model was to sue everyone, get settlement dollars because 
fighting was too expensive.”102 
Furthermore litigation, its heavy financial burden and what it entails afterwards 
regarding innovation are among the top reasons why both businessmen and academics claim 
that patent trolls have an adverse repercussion. Firstly after a costly litigation it is quite 
common that undertakings reduce their R&D policy, which leads into less new investments, 
patent applications and all together reduces innovation.103 One research – regarding a health 
information technology companies, which ceased all innovations in that technology- shows 
how the sales of the company’s products fall by one-third compared to their other patents 
which were not subject of the infringement procedures.104 
According to James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer in 2011 the cost of defendants in 
patent litigation was $29 billion and only 25% was flowed back and was re-invested into 
innovation.105 Another study underlines how “litigation destroys over $60billion in firm 
wealth each year.”106Furthermore according to Catherine Tucker patent trolls’ activity and 
litigations affected a medical imaging technology negatively and reduced the sales by one-
third compared to other products that were not touched by the litigations procedures.107 These 
are just a couple examples that underline the major financial costs and litigation expenses 
defendants have to deal with and how it is responsible for diminution of innovation.  
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Apart from the enormous costs and litigation expenses, there are other factors which 
are detrimental to innovation. As it was mentioned previously, the more companies invest into 
R&D – this possibly implies more patents – the bigger chance they have to become a target of 
a patent troll.108 This likelihood, that patent assertion entities sooner or later might appear 
might lead to an uncomfortable question, namely is it worth it to invest, to promote innovation 
while risking costly litigations?109 This might clearly reduce innovation, even if investments 
would have both social and economic benefits in the future. 
4.3  Growing number and the reasons behind it 
 
As it was mentioned before, litigation is one of the most frequently used strategy of 
patent trolls. However it is important to highlight, and is a mutual feature that litigation is not 
the core aim of these undertakings, it is rather a well-working threat to defendants and to 
companies – due to its high costs, possible injunctive reliefs and the years it may last. Even 
though „litigation is not the desired outcome for the trolls”110 because there is no guarantee of 
winning such cases, however, due to the asymmetrical bargaining power it is a very useful 
weapon. Therefore patent trolls usually not only threat with litigation but sue companies for 
infringements. This is the reason behind the extremely growing number, that in 2014 nearly 
two-thirds of all patent litigations was filed by patent trolls.111 Other research shows that 
„suits brought by PAEs have tripled in just the last two years, rising from 29 percent of all 
infringement suits to 62 percent of all infringement suits. Estimates suggest that PAEs may 
have threatened over 100,000 companies with patent infringement last year (2012) alone.112 
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 There are several reasons both behind the growth of patent infringement law suits – as 
it was elaborated before – and behind the growth of the appearance of patent trolls on this 
market. These two are closely interrelated. The increasing number of broad-patents and 
patents in general, and the asymmetrical bargaining power, the legal environment, and the 
„potential for large payoffs attracts new players to the patent trolling industry”.113 
In the last twenty years there was a growth worldwide regarding the patent 
applications – this can be due to several reasons. Firstly, for instance the R&D investments 
mostly in electronics, audio-visual and information technology pay an important role.114 
Secondly, as some articles underline it, the „patenting philosophy of companies have 
changed”- the so-called ’defensive patenting’ as a strategy on the side of companies also a 
relevant factor regarding the growing number of patent applications.115 Furthermore, the lack 
of difficulties to obtain a patent may also be responsible for such a patent boom.116 The 
number of patent applications within the U.S. tripled between 1980 and 2001117and the patent 
system in general has been growing and expanding in the U.S.118 Owing to a 2005 WIPO 
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research that among the 5.6 million patents worldwide 49% were owned by applicants from 
Japan and the United States.119  
Relying only on the increasing number of patent trolls will not provide an overall 
picture and cannot give a sufficient explanation regarding this question. In order to find the 
source for the reasons one must search for the causes furthermore. An interesting opinion of 
Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley is focusing on the reasons behind the growing number of 
the patents. “Even if the world is more innovative than it used to be, we doubt it is four times 
more innovative than it was in the 1980s, or that it is nearly twelve times as innovative as the 
1870s, a decade that saw the development of the telephone, the lightbulb, and enormous 
railroad innovation, among other innovations. The more logical explanation is that it is 
simply easier to get a patent today than it used to be, and that we are granting patents on 
more obvious inventions than in the past.”120 This conclusion highlights the question form 
another perspective and leads to another conclusion that one of the major problems is the 
quality of the patents and the patent application system itself in the U.S. Several projects and 
researches claim that the increasing number of low-quality patents are one of the biggest 
issues regarding the patent trolling problem and its success. According to a research the 
activity of United States Patent and Trademark Office, regarding the „applications received 
and actual patent issued increased by 80% from 1990 to 2000 and increased by 250% from 
1980 to 2000.”121 Most of the patent litigation cases end in settlement, do not even appear 
before the court, therefore the most important issue is the quality, more precisely the low-
quality of patents.122  
In order to receive a patent in the U.S. the application and the innovation must fulfil 
the following conditions: „invention (patent-eligible subject matter), novelty, non-
obviousness, utility.”123 These conditions are the ground for a successful application, however 
may be the main cause in case of too broad concept. Due to Carol M. Nielsen Michael R. 
Samardzija, “the patent law in the United States is intended to be adaptable to encompass 
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“anything under the sun that is made by man.”124 This is clearly a very broad clarification of 
what can be construed as an invention.  
A whole patent application procedure used to take less than a month before 1990, 
however, it has been extremely lengthened and nowadays it may last for four years or even 
more.125 This amount of time does not entail that the institutions and examiners devote more 
time and effort to analyse the filed applications from a more detailed perspective, but the 
opposite. The examiners are tremendously overwhelmed, have riskily little amount of time to 
review sufficiently and strictly enough an application.126 Due to Stephen Barr the backlog of 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office can be presented with the following example: “If the 
agency could shut its doors to catch up on its work, its 5,500 patent examiners would take 
at least two years to clear the backlog of pending applications. When the agency 
reopened, there would be more than 1 million new applications piled up on the 
doorstep.”127  The reasons behind it – the previously mentioned enormous backlog and time-
constraint, more and more filed applications, overwhelmed examiners – are closely connected 
to the low-quality question regarding the patents from two point of view. One is a legal-based 
question, how this patents are legally weak, however, it may also furthermore include a 
technical quality problem. The extensive and wide limited patents are the source and “daily-
livelihood” of patent trolls.128 
 
5 Legal perspective – the evolution of related legislations; other solutions 
 
As it was elaborated in the chapters above patent trolls and their activity in general 
have been a growing number in the last ten to fifteen years. The discussions about it appeared 
over and over again in legal, economic and business studies, researches have been conducted 
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frequently to highlight their negative influence. The issue became and grew to be such a 
problematic one that caught the attention of the highest stages too.129 Even though there are 
different causes and problems that must be solved in order to avoid further harm on the side of 
non-practising entities – legal solutions, well-defined laws are the key factors and the ground 
in the fight against them. Both state and federal government leaders started to focus on 
proposing new legislation, concentrate on different legal solutions and on improvements in 
the related legal fields with the intention to normalize and secure the targeted fields, to protect 
the targeted companies and entities.130 
5.1  Different patent law reforms and legislations 
 
President Obama signed the Leahy-Smith America Investment Act (AIA) in 
September 16, 2011 at the Thomas Jefferson High School for Science and Technology in 
Alexandris, VA.131 This legislation was filed in by Sen. Patrick Leahy and Rep. Lamar Smith 
and was among the first ones which aimed to help and pursue entrepreneurs and companies to 
invest, and appear on the market more.132 The legal academics’ opinion regarding the act were 
two-folded. On one side it contained several changes, most probably the biggest ones since 
1952, the latest biggest “shakeup of UPSTO.”133 On the other side it did not provide all the 
necessary adjustments, as President Obama said “only went about halfway to, where we need 
to go” due to during the time of the seven years of negotiations, the activities of patent trolls 
were not as much well-known, therefore the focus did not yet shift on them.134 Apart from 
that, it took important steps in decreasing the current patent backlog, created an alternative 
beside patent litigation regarding patent validity by creating new programmes at the Patent 
and Trademark Office and furthermore took an important step to strengthen patent quality by 
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revising the conditions.135 Additionally, arguably the biggest difference it entailed was 
shifting from “first to invent” to a “first to file” system.136 It basically meant that the USPTO 
and the date of file is what matters in deciding who will be legally official owner of a patent. 
Robert Barr a professor of intellectual property law at UC-Berkeley compares the older and 
the new system after the AIA: “Under the old system, if you kept lab notebooks … you could 
prove you were the first inventor even if you were not the first to file, so you didn’t necessarily 
have to be the first to get to the patent office,” he says. “Now, with a few exceptions, you need 
to be the first. If two people come up with the same invention, and they often do … it’s not 
going to matter if you can prove you were the first inventor if you weren’t the first to file.137 
The critics highlights the problem with this system that it highly hinges on the inventors’ 
financial background. As Jonathan Withrow, a partner at Rankin, Hill & Clark explains: “You 
may not file an application ’cause you don’t have the money…And that leaves the door open 
for someone else to file.138 
 At the beginning of 2014 there were two important cases before the Supreme Court, 
which focused on shifting the legal fees in patent cases.139 The Octane Fitness LLC v. ICON 
Health & Fitness, Inc., case was not a typical patent troll case, due to Icon Health, a producer 
of fitness equipment, accused a smaller competitor, Octane Fitness,140 of violating a patent.141 
The defendant won the case and wanted its legal fees to be paid and relied on the “claim was 
obviously baseless” argument142. Even though the district court agreed, the Federal Circuit did 
not. The other case the court heard involved Highmark Inc., a health insurer that claimed it 
was not violating a patent regarding computer software.143 As the one mentioned above the 
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defendant also prevailed and convinced the district court’s judge to order the patent owner to 
pay legal fees on the ground that the complaint was baseless, however, the Federal Circuit did 
not agree once more.144 Before the Supreme Court’s Octane judgement to rely on baseless 
arguments the Federal Circuit required actual evidences which show bad faith and baseless on 
the side of the other party – this practice was absolutely in favour of patent trolls.145 
Fortunately the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s argument and “heightened proof 
standard, holding a case is “exceptional” if, by a preponderance of the evidence, it “stands 
out” from others with respect to the substantive strength of the party’s position or the 
unreasonable manner of litigating.”146 With such ruling the Court give a strong tool in the 
hand of companies in the fight against patent trolls and made it a lot more dangerous to file a 
patent infringement suit.147 With the Highmark v. Allcare Management Systems case the 
Supreme Court further strengthened this ruling and highlighted in its judgement, that the 
Federal Circuit’ practice was too strict.148  
 So far nineteen states have focused, amended and introduced legislations regarding 
bad faiths in patent entities and all in all twenty-seven states have anti-patent trolling 
legislation.149 This data shows how seriously states take the patent trolling problem. Even 
though patent law in general is a federal subject, states do introduce anti-patent trolling acts 
on their own, being Vermont the first state in May, 2013.150 These acts mainly cover and 
focus widely on the question of bad faith assertions, provides factors that help the courts to 
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consider in such cases, some state provide penalties for related violations, and provide basic 
definitions of such undertaking, etc.…151 
 Apart from the below elaborated Innovation Act and Patent Act there are four major 
bills introduced before the Congress.152  
 The STRONG Act of 2015, more precisely the Support Technology and Research for 
Our Nation’s Growth Patents Act of 2015153 is not actually and only a patent reform, 
however, closely related therefore it is also mentioned in this paper. The bill was 
introduced by Sen. Coons and co-sponsored by Sens. Durbin and Hirono who oppose 
the Innovation Act.154 The act primarily focuses at the USPTO regarding reviewing 
patents, would lower the burden of proof of wilful infringements, would introduce the 
possibility of reduced USPTO fees for universities, additionally it would “pre-empt all 
state legislation regarding bad faith demand letters.155” 
 The TROL Act of 2015 – Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters Act of 2015 – was 
introduced in April 28, 2015 by Rep. Burgess. Focuses on demand letters, however, 
does not includes what they must contain.156 Similarly as the STRONG Act, also 
would pre-empt all the state legislations that penalizes sending demand letters in bad 
faith.157 
 The Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2015 – was introduced on April 20, 2016 by 
Rep. Polis,158 once again with the focus on demand letters. This Act would require 
each and every entity which sends a certain number of demand letters to submit these 
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to the USPTO, highlighting each patent which they rely on.159 This Act goes further 
by defining demand letters as “any written communication directed to an unaffiliated 
third party stating or indicating that the intended recipient, or anyone affiliated with 
that recipient, is or may be infringing a patent, or may bear liability or owe 
compensation to another because of such patent.”160 Also states what demand letters 
must contain. In addition authorises the court to penalize entities if their infringement 
does not meet the USPTO requirements.161 
 The Innovation protection Act of 2015 – supported and introduced by Rep. Conyers 
and focuses on end fee diversion from the USPTO.162 
 
5.2 Comparison of the Innovation Act and the PATENT Act 
 
 Apart from the abovementioned patent legislations, both the U.S House of 
Representatives and the Senate have introduced their patent related legislations, with the 
intention to solve patent trolling problems the best possible way. These bills are quite similar 
in several part, however, contain differences too.163 The Innovation Act was filed in for the 
second time – the act was introduced previously but got blocked at the Senate – and this time 
it is sponsored by Rep. Goodlatte.164 The bill went through several amendments, including a 
“manager’s package”, and passed the House Judiciary Committee in June 2015.165 This bill 
touches all the important questions regarding the anti-patent troll debate especially patent 
infringement litigation. The Senate has also introduced a bill in the subject under the name of 
Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015 (The Patent Act) on April 29, 
                                                 
159 H.R.1896 — 114th Congress (2015-2016) 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1896 
160 H.R.1896 — 114th Congress (2015-2016) 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1896 
161 H.R.1896 — 114th Congress (2015-2016) 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1896 
162 Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation 
http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-patent-reform-
legislation/ 
163 Ryan Davis - 4 Differences In The House And Senate Patent Troll Bills. April 30, 2015 
http://www.law360.com/articles/650207/4-differences-in-the-house-and-senate-patent-troll-bills 
164 Tom Risen – Congress again targets patent trolls. May 1, 2015. 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/05/01/congress-again-targets-patent-trolls 
165 Tom Risen – Congress again targets patent trolls. May 1, 2015. 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/05/01/congress-again-targets-patent-trolls 
37 
 
2015 by Senator Grassley and touches upon basically on the same ideas, therefore the two 
bills have similar provisions too.166 
 It is quite interesting to compare these two bills from a legal perspective, due they 
cover almost the same areas and both include solutions for the most important and urgent 
issues regarding patent law and anti-patent regulations but from different perspectives. The 
most crucial difference is the fee-shifting question. Attorney and legal fees are one of the key 
questions in the fight against patent trolls and the possibility to shift these fees to the other 
party in case they bring baseless infringement suits would make patent suit far more risky. 
According to Gene Quinn, the difference is that “while both bills allow for consideration of 
special circumstances, as you can see by comparing the language…it is clear that the House 
version of fee shifting found in the Innovation Act requires attorneys’ fees to be awarded in 
all cases unless there is a finding by the court that the non-prevailing party took positions that 
were reasonably justified in law and fact… To the contrary, the language of the Senate bill 
takes the direct opposite approach, requiring attorney’s fees only if the district court makes a 
finding that the non-prevailing party took positions that were not objectively reasonable. 
Thus, the Senate bill creates a presumption that attorney’s fees are ordinarily not awarded, 
but can be awarded if there is a satisfactory showing.”167 Some attorneys and academics have 
concerns about whether the House version of the fee-shifting provisions may actually have an 
adverse effect and will actually discourage undertakings from filing even legitimate suits, 168 
while others, believe the Senate version did not go far enough but rather “leave a safe harbour 
for patent trolls”.169  
 Another crucial point is the fee recovery. Both acts contain provisions stopping patent 
assertion entities to disappear behind shell companies which have no financial background, or 
other assets and lack the ability to pay the fee award, however once again the solutions 
differ.170 On one hand the House provision declares in case of the losing party cannot pay, 
“the court shall grant a motion by the prevailing party to join to the litigation another 
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interested party that has a direct financial interest in the patents to be liable for the fee 
award.”171 On the other hand the Senate version differs in a crucial point. It “aims to identify 
such interested parties earlier in the litigation, rather than after fees have been awarded, and 
makes clear that joinder of such parties is necessary only when the plaintiff is a nonpracticing 
entity, and that the provision does not apply to universities.”172 The Senate version in this 
way is a bit more direct, detailed and provides a safe harbour to universities, while the House 
version is a lot more general provision. 
 At last but not least the bills differ regarding demand letters. The Senate bill goes 
further once more and provides more detailed provisions, includes requirements and a 
wilfulness provision, additionally creates penalties too “for those who “engage in the 
widespread sending” of misleading demand letters.”173 It is important to mention and point at 
the “widespread sending” expression due to it targets patent trolls, it is a typical patent trolling 
strategy to send out thousands of demand letters at once and this bill perfectly captures and 
fights against the patent assertation entities’ typical behaviour. 
 
5.3  Other solutions 
 
 While both the States and higher political stages provide and introduce bills, different 
legislations in order to stop the patent trolling practices and concentrating on the important 
issues there are other solutions and ideas which may have positive effect too. 
 One interesting solution was introduced by Google. Google announced its programme 
called Patent Purchase Promotion under the slogan “trust us not the trolls”, which aimed to 
help smaller inventors, startups which are at a high risk of being targeted by a patent troll.174 
Google decided to open up a platform between May 8-22, 2015 where these companies had 
an opportunity to apply with their patents on this platform and later on Google decided 
whether it is worth to buy the patents or not. Google claimed that with this solution, it tries to 
block patent trolls and their activity which may contain acquiring valuable patents from small 
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patent holders.175 However, different articles questioned this selflessness176 and rather agreed, 
that Google is trying to build up a major patent portfolio without any further details or 
information what it seeks or plans to do with the patents afterwards.177 
 There are different associations, like the Internet Association, which represents 
internet companies across America providing information regarding the subject178, similarly 
the TrollingEffect website that contains information and news regarding patent trolls and their 
activity, strategy to the public.179 Additionally, AlliedSecurityTrust180represents bigger 
companies like Google and IBM – serves as an entity which practices the so-called “defence 
patenting” and is fighting against patent trolls on behalf of those companies.181 As Nicholas 
Janssens de Bisthoven characterizes them they are basically “tolerated contra trolls” due to 
they cannot file lawsuit against the members.182 
 Apart from solutions there are some practices which could strengthen the targeted 
firms in the fight against a patent troll. These may vary all the way from possibly rely on 
rather strong and not so wide patents, to team up with other undertakings in the industry who 
have been also attacked by a patent troll and fight as a group before the courts – in this way 
splitting the possible legal fees.183 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
 One of the purpose of this paper was to provide an overall picture of patent trolls, 
about their activities, strategies, in order to get an initial understanding and to be able to 
differentiate between them and other entities with similar business behaviour.  In conclusion, 
it is safe to say that the biggest problem with the patent trolls is that they function legally and 
                                                 
175 Richard Beem - Patents: Buy, Sell, or Practice? What Google Learned May Surprise You! 
176 Michael Loney – Google’s patent purchase experiment leaves unanswered question. 25 April 2015. 
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take advantage of the nature of the U.S. patent systems. Due to this feature it may be a 
difficulty to decide whether someone is facing a patent troll or simply up against a company 
with a tight competition strategy, or an entity that is practising defensive patenting in order to 
secure its market and interests. From a legal point of view it is very interesting how an 
originally helpful and inventor-supportive legal territory that intends to promote inventions, 
investments, additionally to the possibility to enter markets, may cause major and sometimes 
irrevocable problems and how it leads thousands of companies into solvency, slows down 
innovation and investments on the targeted fields.  
 These highly targeted fields generally understood as IT and telecommunications only, 
however research show an increase of patent trolls’ interest towards the bio and 
pharmaceuticals industries too.184 According to Robin Feldman and W. Nicholson Price II 
signs appeared that patent trolls are approaching towards these territories, especially through 
acquiring university patents.185 
 Furthermore, this paper aimed to analyse the related legislations and different bills 
through which the politicians fight against non-practicing entities in the U.S. The urgency of 
solving the patent troll problem is happening constantly. New bills are being introduced by 
senators’ regularly which aim to amend the related rules, focusing on the most crucial legal 
issues. These bills include some highly appropriate and useful solutions which could bring the 
expected results and may change the situation between patent trolls and targeted companies 
regarding the asymmetrical bargaining power.  
 These typical legislative problems that need solutions on the side of the U.S. 
legislation are at the doorstep of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) too. In a 
recent case between Huawei v. ZTE186 the CJEU issued its judgement, focusing on Article 
102 TFEU187 regarding an alleged infringement of a standard essential patent. The CJEU 
stated the conditions of demand letters and the necessary steps prior bringing an action.188 
With this ruling the CJEU ruled on one of the crucial legislative issues that are handled within 
inter alia the Innovation and Patent Act, and will hopefully further monitor the legislative 
challenges – even though approached from a different, competition law perspective. 
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  Due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s previously mentioned decision189 and the nature of 
patents itself it is up to the owner of the patent to decide whether it wishes to use and practice 
its patent and the related rights or not, therefore even though the number of patent trolls will 
be highly reduced after the implementation of the anti-troll legislations, it is doubtful that they 
will absolutely disappear from the business world. However, even though wilful characters 
will appear and target companies, the situation and the opportunities of the companies will be 
a lot more promising and different, additionally threatening with law suit will be far more 
risky and hazardous, placing the patent trolls into a lot more unpleasant and uncertain 
position. 
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